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compensation was granted in Thomas, it is doubtful whether the re-
sult will be the same in a situation where the public need is great
and the cost of compensation will make the project too expensive.
Criticism of a flexible rule based on fairness and policy often cen-
ters on the fact that it lacks certainty and predictability. 29 While the
Thomas approach may be subject to this criticism, it allows a land-
owner to invest in his land with the certainty that compensation will
not be denied upon doctrinal grounds alone. This same approach
will now compel the government to consider the effect that a proposed
project will have upon individual landowners. The fact that a proper
governmental function is being performed will no longer by itself
be a basis for denying compensation.
It is too early to tell what the full impact of Thomas will be, but
it is of significance that a court has finally departed from doctrin-
aire concepts (which look only to see if a proper governmental func-
tion is being performed or if the condemnee is claiming what may
be called a public right) and has applied a test of fairness. This does
not mean that Thomas necessarily disagrees with the results reached
in other cases, but that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky reached its
decision outside a rigid doctrinal mold.
LEIGHTON S. HOUCK
TORT ACTION FOR STRICT LIABILITY IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
Suits by consumers against manufacturers for injuries caused by
their defective products have had a turbulent history. These suits were
brought in either tort1 or contract, 2 and privity of contract was a
^38 S. CAL. L. REV. 689 (1965).
"E.g., Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964); Greeno v. Clark
Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng.
Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
Products liability cases were historically founded in tort, allowing a negligence
action against a seller of goods only where there existed privity of contract between
the parties. Several exceptions were created to rectify the obvious inequities of the
privity requirement. See Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865
(8th Cir. 19o3); Jaeger, How Strict Is the Manufacturer's Liability? Recent De-
velopment, 48 MARQ. L. Rrv. 293, 296 (1964-65). However, the privity requirement
in negligence actions was subsequently abolished in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1o5o (1916).
-E.g., Conner v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Mo. 1939);
Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 57 (N.D. Ill. 1935).
A warranty cause of action originated as a pure action of tort closely allied
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prerequisite to recovery in either action.3 Since negligent manufac-
turers were using lack of privity to insulate themselves from liability,
the requirement was initially abolished in tort actions.4 Subsequently
courts began to utilize legal fictions in an attempt to abolish the
privity doctrine in warranty actions based upon a contract.5 The
use of these fictions and the facts that the decline of the privity
doctrine has not been uniform in application or theory, has added
to the already existing confusion in products liability cases. 6
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently attempted to rectify
this confusion in Dippel v. Sciano7 by maintaining privity as a pre-
requisite to recovery in a warranty action, but adopting strict liability
in tort for actions where privity was not present.
In Dippel, the plaintiff was a guest in a commercial tavern. While
he was assisting in the moving of a pool table, the front leg assembly
collapsed, severing several of his toes. An action was commenced
against the tavern owner, the manufacturer of the table and the sales
distributor who had purchased the table and leased it to the tavern
owner. Plaintiff brought two actions in negligence and one for breach
of implied warranty by the manufacturer and sales distributor. The
trial court sustained the sales distributor's demurrer to the warranty
action and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed upon the ground
that there was no privity between the seller and the plaintiff.
The court first noted that under the Uniform Sales Act, privity was
required in actions for breach of implied warranty,8 and that Wis-
to deceit. See Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. Rv. i, 8 (1888); 1 S.
WILLISTON, SALES § 197 (rev. ed. 1948). However, the warranty action only arose
from the warrantor's consent to be bound. Since 1778, an express or implied
warranty has been regarded as being based on a contract of sale. Stuart v. Wilkins,
99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778). Upon this theory ,the courts have required privity of
contract between the contracting parties. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 96 (3d ed. 1964).
3See notes I and 2 supra.
'The leading decision in this area in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), where the court stated that privity of contract was
not a prerequisite for a tort action in products liability cases. See W. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 96 (3d ed. 1964).
5See 8 S. WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs §§ 998, 9 9 8A (3 d ed. Jaeger 1964).
OThe area of products liability has been ill-defined since its inception. In rela-
tion to the law of warranty, Prosser states that the "seller's warranty is a curious
hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the law."
W. PRossSE, TORTS § 95, at 651 (3d ed. 1964).
"37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N-V.2d 55 (1967).
"The accident in Dippel occurred before the Uniform Commercial Code was
enacted in Wisconsin, and therefore the Wisconsin version of the Uniform Sales
Act was controlling. 155 N.W.2d at 6o. The court noted, however, that this was
unimportant since it was only concerned with whether products liability cases
should be treated as matters of warranty or strict liability in tort. Id. at 61.
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consin's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code did not change
this basic requirement. 9 The court stated that it was reluctant to
deal with legal fictions which had long been utilized to avoid the
privity requirement in breach of warranty actions. 10 It noted further
that in addition to the privity requirement, warranty actions are
attended by the Code's restrictive requirements of notice to the seller
of a breach of warranty"- as well as the provision allowing a dis-
claimer of warranty by the manufacturer or seller.
12
To avoid the Uniform Commercial Code's restrictive require-
ments, particularly privity, and the necessity of dealing in fictions to
circumvent those requirements, the court held that in the absence
of privity, products liability cases are properly a matter of strict liabil-
ity in tort under § 4 o2A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.13 Under
this rule, the consumer would not be encumbered by the requirements
of privity, notice, and a valid disclaimer, all of which inhere in war-
ranty actions. Although the consumer would not be forced to prove
o§ 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that any person who is in
the family, household or a guest of the buyer, may sue the immediate seller, in
his own right on a warranty action. But Comment 3 of § 2-318 indicates that the
Code does not purport to enlarge or restrict the privity requirement in an action
between a consumer and manufacturer or distributor. The failure of the Code
to follow the moden trend to circumvent privity in warranty actions appears
relevant. The most logical explanation seems to be that the drafters of the Code
appreciated the effects such a drastic action would have, and decided to avoid any
further confusion of the law of warranties.
Several states did not expressly adopt § 2-318. California and Utah have not
adopted § 2-318, and put no similar provision in its place. Other states have made
limited changes, such as Connecticut which merely codified Comment 3 of § 2-318.
Finally, some jurisdictions have replaced § 2-318 with specific "anti-privity"
statutes. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965); see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 155-2-318
(1963).
10155 N.W.2d at 6o.
2'UNIFORNI COIMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3)(a).
2UNIFORAI COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3)(a).
"REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4o2A (1965) states:
(i) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (i) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
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specific acts of negligence,' 4 he would need to sustain several burdens
of proof as prerequisites to recovery.'5 Moreover, to prevent the
manufacturer from becoming an insurer of the public, the court added
an element which does not appear in § 40o2A of the Restatement and
said the defense of contributory negligence would be available.
Fictions were first used to erode the privity requirement of war-
ranty actions in cases involving food, beverages or drugs for human
consumption. 16 The erosion soon spread to markets other than food
and drugs. Three principal fictions were developed to circumvent the
privity requirement. First, extensive advertising by the manufacturer,
coupled with consumer reliance, served as a substitute for privity.
17
Second, a dealer or distributor was considered a mere conduit through
which the contract was made, with the actual contract being between
the consumer and the manufacturer.' 8 Third, an implied warranty
merely stated the legal consequences of a transaction and was not
based on contract with its consequent privity.' 9 It should be noted,
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment a (1965).
'For an enumeration of these burdens of proof, see text at n. 36 infra.
"6See 8 S. WImusrON, CONTRArs §§ 994, 994A (3d ed. Jaeger 1964). This excep-
tion to the privity rule was later extended to products which were dangerous for
external use by humans. E.g., Patterson v. George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 5O1,
370 P.2d us6 (1962); see 8 S. WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 994A (3d ed. Jaeger 1964).
Some courts have held that a warranty of fitness and wholesomeness of food
products attaches to and runs with the goods. Therefore, a warranty action could
be had by anyone along the distributive chain despite the lack of privity. E.g.,
Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
Other courts in cases dealing with food and drugs have rejected the privity
principle on the basis of a public policy to protect human health and life. E.g.,
Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P..d 1094 (1957);
Heimsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., Ill. App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953);
Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); see Klein
v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Gottsdanker v. Cutter
Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist. Ct. App. 196o).
17E.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d
399 (1962); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612
(1958). This theory has been extended to cases involving the consumer's reliance
upon the labels, tags and brochures of the manufacturers. If the consumer is there-
after injured, courts have held that he can maintain a warranty action, despite
the lack of privity. E.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., supra;
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
"8E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (96o).
"E.g., Bookholt v. General Motors Corp., 215 Ga. 391, 11o S.E.2d 642 (1959).
These three fictions permitted a consumer to maintain a breach of warranty
action against a remote manufacturer, but they greatly added to the confusion in
products liability cases because, with no privity requirement, it was difficult to
distinguish a warranty action from a tort action.
One jurisdiction has held that a warranty action is a new form of action,
distinct from both tort and contract. Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire &: Rubber
Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (applying admiralty law).
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however, that courts, in many instances, continue to require privity in
a warranty action.
20
Another burdensome requirement to plaintiffs in warranty actions
and one which the Uniform Commercial Code perpetuates, is notice
to the seller of a breach of warranty.21 Those courts which have at-
tempted to circumvent the privity requirement and to allow recovery
against a remote manufacturer have also attempted to avoid the
notice requirement under § 2-607(3)(a) of the Uniform Commercial
Code. They rationalize that the Code's requirement that "the buyer
must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have dis-
covered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any
remedy .... -"22 merely contemplates those direct sales between parties
in privity with each other. Therefore, they hold the notice require-
ment inapplicable in a warranty action by a consumer against the
remote manufacturer.
23
2E.g., Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961); Alexander
v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1968); Blum v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 268 F. Supp. 906 (D. Md. 1965); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Harris, 280 Ala. 93, 19o
So. 2d 286 (1966); Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1o41
(1954); Gordon v. Clairol, Inc., 22 Conn. Supp. 209, x66 A.2d 209 (C.P. Fair-
field County 196o); Behringer v. William Gretz Brewing Co., 53 Del. 365, 169 A.2d
249 (1961); Albin v. Illinois Crop Improvement Ass'n, 3o Ill. App. 2d 283, 174
N.E.2d 697 (1961); Gordon v. Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co., 158 So. 223 (La. App.
1935); Kennedy v. Brockelman Bros., 334 Mass. 225, 134 N.E.2d 747 (1956);
Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 A. 186 (1925); Canter v. American Cyanamid
Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 691, 207 N.Y.S.2d 745 (196o); Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230
S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 6oi (1956); Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 385, 347
P.2d io56 (ig6o).
=See note 1 supra. The primary purpose of the notice requirement is to
inform the seller that production and distribution of the defective product should
be halted, thereby protecting the public from future harm. See Franklin, When
Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Products Cases,
18 STANFORD L. REv. 974, 997 (1966). It would also give the seller an early
opportunity to recall those defective products already sold and to correct such
defects.
Another purpose of the notice requirement is to advise the seller that he
must meet a claim for damages, in which the law requires an early warning. E.g.,
Columbia Axle Co. v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 63 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1933); Ameri-
can Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Bd., 7 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1925); Reininger v.
Eldon Mfg. Co., 114 Cal. App. 2d 240, 250 P.2d 4 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
nUNIFORaI COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3)(a).
2This interpretation defeats the primary purpose of the notice requirement
because knowledge of the defective nature of the product is essential to the non-
privity seller so that he can remove the product from the market and correct the
defect. See note 21 supra. Furthermore, Comment 5 of § 2-607, in its rationale as
to third party beneficiaries (contemplated in § 2-318), states:
[Tihe reason of this section does extend to requiring the beneficiaries to
notify the seller that an injury has occurred .... [E]ven a beneficiary can
1969]
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A few courts have attempted to ease the notice requirement, rather
than abolish it, by holding that the statute of limitations on the action
does not begin to run until the consumer discovers the defect. 24 While
the courts have perhaps reached the right conclusion, they have done
so for the wrong reason. A contract statute of limitations commences
to run upon the sale of the product,25 while a tort statute of limita-
tions commences to run at the time of the injury.26 Since a warranty
action is based upon contract, the statute of limitations should begin
to run at the time the product was sold to the customer.
It is evident that the requirements of privity and notice as well
as the availability of a disclaimer by the defendant have tended to
make difficult a consumer's recovery for a breach of warranty against
a remote manufacturer. 27 Furthermore, attempts to bypass the require-
ments have led to the use of legal fictions, some of which strain
recognized legal principles.
28
There were early attempts to alleviate these obstacles to consumer
recovery by imposing strict liability upon the remote manufacturer
when sued in a contractual warranty action.29 However, this was un-
successful since the privity and notice requirements were carried over
and applied to warranty actions notwithstanding the imposition of
be properly held to the use of good faith in notifying, once he has had
time to become aware of the legal situation.
A third party beneficiary being required to give notice, even though he is techni-
cally not in privity with the seller, is analogous to a consumer who is not in
privity with the remote manufcturer. Therefore, the argument that the notice
requirement of § 2-607(3)(a) is inapplicable because of the lack of privity, is
not valid.
"E.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961); Davidson v. Wee.
93 Ariz. 191, 379 P.2d 744 (1963); Southern Cal. Enterprises, Inc. v. D.N. & E.
Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 178 P.2d 785 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Puretex
Lemon Juice, Inc. v. S. Riekes & Sons, 351 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ. App. i96t).
-I S. W stLisrON, SALES § 212(a) (rev. ed. 1948).
"E.g., Gahimer v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 241 F.2d 836 (7 th Cir. 1957);
Rodibaugh v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 570, 37 Cal. Rptr. 646
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964); see Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111
N.E.2d 421 (1953).
"See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 which allows a seller to exclude any
implied warranties, if the language of the disclaimer mentions merchantability
and, in the case of a writing is conspicuous.
"See cases cited in notes 17-19 supra.
"See Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Towards Strict Liability, 24
TENN. L. REv. 963, 985-999 (1957); Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel, 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1102-1114 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791, 802 (1966); Comment, Implied Warranties-The Privity Rule and Strict
Liability-The Non-Food Cases, 27 Mo. L. REv. 194, 221-23 (1962). See also W.
PROSSER, TORTS § 97 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, com-
ments b, m (1965).
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strict liability.30 Thus, courts still had to resort to fictions to allow
recovery.
Some states have abolished the privity requirement by statute,31
while in other states statutes have been enacted in an attempt to ease
the notice requirement.32 Most states, however, have failed to do either
of these, and the only way to circumvent the privity and notice re-
quirements is still by the use of legal fictions.
Taking cognizance of the fact that where no privity existed, liability
could not be predicated upon contract without the use of legal fictions,
the American Law Institute adopted § 4 02A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.33 This section provides that a manufacturer sell-
ing a defective product is strictly liable in tort to the ultimate con-
sumer even where privity is not present. Because this is a tort action,
the notice requirement of the warranty action is not present either.
When Dip pel was decided, Wisconsin became one of an increasing
number of states adopting § 402A or a similar rule.34 Under § 4 o2A
the injured consumer must bear several burdens of proof before
succeeding in his claim.35 Dippel adopted similar burdens and re-
quired the plaintiff to show:
cSee Comment, Implied Warranties-The Privity Rule and Strict Liability-
The Non-Food Cases, 27 Mo. L. REv. 194, 221-23 (1962).
fE.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965); see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 155-2-318
(1963). The disadvantage of abolishing privity in the Code would be to treat a
warranty action as a tort action, with contract limitations of notice and disclaimer.
Thus, a warranty action would become a hybrid form of action without a firm
basis in either contract or tort law. This would prevent the uniformity of applica-
tion which the Uniform Code tries to achieve. See generally Prosser, The Assault
Upon The Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1O99 (1960).
aE.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1769 (West 1957); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 121 , § 49
(Smith-Hurd 196o).
'OAMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, 1964, at 349-56 (1965); Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel, 5o MINN. L. REv. 791, 802 (1966). It should be noted that §
402A was directed only at creating a strict liability action in tort and not a
strict liability action in warranty.
2Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964); Lee v. Sears Roebuck
Co., 262 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Tenn. 1966); Hacker v. Rector, 250 F. Supp. 300
(W.D. Mo. 1966); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965);
Nalbandian v. Byron Jackson Pumps, Inc., 97 Ariz. 280, 399 P.2d 681 (1965); 0. S.
Stapley Co. v. Miller, 6 Ariz. App. 122, 430 P.2d 701 (1967); Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Garthwait v.
Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Dealers Transport Co. v. Battery
Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375
Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d
113 (Miss. 1966); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., I Ohio App. 2d 374, 2o5 N.E.2d 92 (1965);
Cochran v. Brooke, 243 Ore. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424,
220 A.2d 853 (1966).
GSee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 02A, comments f,g,i,p,q (1965).
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(i) that the product was in defective condition when it left
the possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) that the defect
was a cause ... of the plaintiff's injuries or damages, (4) that the
seller engaged in the business of selling such product ... and
(5) that the product was one which the seller expected to and
did reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition it was when he sold it.36
The first of these requirements appears to be the most burdensome
and such proof is difficult3 7 without the aid of judicial presumptions
or inferences.
In addition to the harsh burdens of proof imposed upon the
plaintiff, Dippel's interpretation of § 402A protects the interests of
defendant manufacturers in products liability cases by expressly pro-
viding them with a defense of contributory negligence. This is con-
trary to the express language of § 402A which provides that con-
tributory negligence is not a defense in a strict liability action "when
such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in
the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence."
38
Generally, contributory negligence is not available in a strict liability
action because there is no negligence in the action with which the
defense can be compared; and contributory negligence can only be
used as a defense in those actions in which negligence is an elment.30
Dippel recognized this fact but carved out an exception in products
liability cases by reasoning that strict liability was similar to, or inter-
changeable with, "negligence per se." 40 The court noted that violation
of a statutory duty to prevent injury-producing, defective products
from entering the consumer market would be considered negligence
per se. A court could impose the same duty without the existence of
0155 N.W.2d at 63.
3REsTATrMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g (1965) states that the
"burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left
the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence
can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the
burden is not sustained." (Emphasis added).
If the consumer does not meet this burden, it will be assumed that the defect
was caused by a third party. E.g., Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964).
Once the plaintiff has borne this heavy burden of proof, it is quite likely that
some negligence was involved, even though this need not be proved. See Ford
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966).
nRESTATExENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
MW. PROSSER, TORTS § 78, at 538 (3 d ed. 1964).
°155 N.W.2d at 63-64.
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such statute, and violation of the court-made duty would likewise
constitute negligence per se.4 ' Characterizing the defendant's conduct
as negligence per se in a § 4 o2A type of strict liability action, there-
fore, enables him to utilize the defense of contributory negligence
since negligence would be an element of the consumer's cause of action.
The court adopted this defense in order to prevent a manufacturer
from becoming an "insurer" of the public as to all injuries resulting
from his products on the market.
Both § 4 o2A and Dippel allow the remote manufacturer to use the
defense of assumption of risk. Dippel's characterization of strict
liability as negligence per se is not a prerequisite to the availability of
this defense since negligence is not an element of the defense.42
One major effect of the adoption of § 4 o2A strict liability in
Dippel is the elimination of much of the existing confusion in pro-
ducts liability cases in a jurisdiction which had not by statute abolished
privity or eased the notice requirement. This is accomplished by
channeling those actions where the consumer and seller are in privity
to warranty actions, and those where no privity is found into strict
liability actions in tort.43 This approach eliminates the need of
utilizing legal fictions to circumvent privity in warranty actions since
a consumer not in privity can sue only in the strict liability tort
actions.
Where legal fictions are utilized to circumvent the privity require-
ment, a warranty action is practically indistinguishable from a strict
liability action in tort. In those states which adhere to theory plead-
ing, the plaintiff-consumer must make a critical choice as to which
theory to plead. By channeling the actions into privity and non-
privity categories, the critical choice is obviated.44
However, § 4oA as adopted in Dippel affords much greater pro-
"Other jurisdictions have recognized the use of contributory negligence in a
§ 402A strict liability case. E.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv.,
45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); see 0. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 6 Ariz. App. 122,
430 P.2d 701 (1967); Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965).
"NV. PROSSOR, TORTS § 67 (3 d ed. 1964). Under this theory, if the consumer
voluntarily and unreasonably encounters a known danger, he will be precluded
from complaining of a risk which he brought upon himself with full appreciation
of the danger. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 78 (3 d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 4 02A, comment n (1965); Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel, 69
YALE L.J. 1o99, 1147-48 (1960).
3Comment f of § 4 02A indicates that the section is concerned with actions by
a consumer against a remote manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer or distributor.
"This approach will not affect consumers in "fact pleading" states, where a
legal theory does not have to be pleaded. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 2.5-2-9
(1965).
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tection to remote manufacturers than they have in warranty actions.
This is a result of the fact that the consumer's burden of proof in a
strict liability action requires him to show that the product was
defective when it left the manufacturer's hands. A consumer in a
warranty action need only prove the contractual warranty, breach
of warranty and resultant injury.4 5
Accordingly, it would appear that continuing the fictions in a
warranty action would perhaps be more equitable to the injured
consumer than limiting his action to § 4 02A strict liability with its
difficult burdens of proof. Making it difficult for the plaintiff to re-
cover seems incongruous since the purpose in creating a strict liability
action in tort was to afford injured consumers an adequate remedy
against even remote manufacturers and sellers.40
One possible method of easing the plaintiff's burden of proving
that the product was defective would be to invoke the aid of prima
facie presumptions that the product was defective when it left the
manufacturer's hands if it is defective when it reaches the consumer.
Another method would be to follow the lead of several states which
have adopted § 4 o2A or a similar rule, but which liberalized the
plaintiff's burden of proof.4 7 These states have required proof only
that the consumer was injured as a result of an undiscovered defect
in the design or manufacturer of the product. The consumer need
not prove that the product was in a defective condition when it left
the manufacturer's hands.
While either of these methods would ease plaintiff's burdens of
proof and thereby make the result consistent with the purpose of
§ 402A, the defendant would not, as Dippel feared, become an "in-
surer" since he would still have available the defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk.
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5
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, comment 13.
4 6
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4o2A, comment c (1965).
4Wandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, g9i P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964); Santor v. A.&M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (965);
Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., I Ohio App. 2d 374, 2o5 N.E.2d 92 (1965).
